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Wordsworth’s Cabinets and Virtuosi: 
Unstable Forms of Knowledge in The Prelude
Christopher E. J. Simons
Introduction
   This paper examines examples of the language of the Kunstkammer or 
Wunderkammer (the collector’s cabinet of art, antiquities, ‘curiosities’, and 
‘wonders’), and the character of the ‘virtuoso’ (the collector, antiquary, 
connoisseur,  and  natural  philosopher)  and  its  parodies  in  William 
Wordsworth’s autobiographical epic poem, The Prelude. A reading of four 
passages related to cabinets and virtuosos invites discussion of the text’s 
complex positions on nature, classification, and mechanistic philosophy in 
the context of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemologies.
   The paper argues that the images of the ‘cabinet’ and the ‘virtuoso’ are 
highly unstable signifiers in their historical contexts. These images allow 
the poem to simultaneously critique opposing forces in intellectual history. 
On the one hand, these images critique the naturalism of the ‘New Science’ 
of the Enlightenment—the legacy of Bacon, Kepler, Descartes, and Locke—
while making assumptions about its mechanistic and utilitarian goals, and 
its devotion to classifying and categorising objects and phenomena. On the 
other hand, these images also carry an implicit critique of the supernatural 
scholasticism of the classical and pre-Early-Modern periods, which 
manifests in the late eighteenth century as retrograde antiquarianism, 
scientific  dilettantism,  and  the  character  of  the  myopic  antiquary  or 
collector. Here the text makes contrasting assumptions about the disorder, 
anti-historicism, and superstitions of the Kunstkammer as the prototypical 
museum.  While  these  texts  generally  position  Wordsworth  against 
mechanistic  natural  philosophy,  in  favour  of  a  more  superstitious 
scholasticism, they simultaneously display a methodical, analytical 
304
Enlightenment mind at work. The Prelude’s ultimate critique of the virtuoso 
turned man of business, the modern ‘Dwarf Man’ virtuoso, does not attack 
the diversity of his knowledge, but its ironic incompleteness based on the 
fields it neglects. Wordsworth displays the reasoning of a transitional, 
Baconian natural philosopher—in the vein of Thomas Browne and John 
Evelyn—by pointing out the dangers of discarding the materials of the 
fancy, to the development of the human mind.
   Through readings of passages of cabinets and virtuosos in Books 2, 3, 
and 5 of The Prelude, the paper will argue that Wordsworth’s occasional 
use of these images in his work—what he might term objects removed 
from context in order to be classified, arranged, and positioned ‘In 
disconnection, dead and spiritless’—significantly bears on a central 
concern in his poetry: the relationship between history, nature, and the 
creative imagination. The paper will analyse in detail the two passages 
from Book 2 and 3 that specifically use the word ‘cabinet’. The paper will 
then analyse descriptions of two virtuosi or collectors from Prelude Book 
5—one positive and one parodic. The paper concludes that the Prelude uses 
unstable images of the cabinet, the museum, and the virtuoso to intuit or 
move towards a description of the role of the creative imagination in the 
observation of nature—a striving for a sense of organism against the grid 
of natural classification in the early nineteenth century.
Theoretical and Historical Contexts 
   The tension between scholasticism and naturalism has implications for 
the reader’s conceptions of history, fancy, and imagination in Wordsworth 
texts. Basil Willey first traced the tension between scholasticism and 
naturalism in Wordsworth’s poetry. Willey categorised a number of 
seventeenth-century  thinkers  as  to  their  position  between  the 
‘scholasticism’ of Aristotle and its Christian development in Thomas 
Aquinas, on the one hand; and the empiricism of Galileo, Francis Bacon, 
and Descartes on the other, which culminated in the ‘overthrow’ of 
scholasticism by Newton. Willey concludes his study with a discussion of 
Wordsworth as a poet-philosopher reacting against this overthrow at the 
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end of the eighteenth century, and as an advocate for intellectual enquiry 
that tempers naturalism with spirituality. Willey writes, in sympathy with 
Wordsworth:
We may not want these ‘truths’ [of religious experience to be] 
theologically and metaphysically expressed; but we do want to be 
able to experience reality in all its rich multiplicity, instead of being 
condemned by the modern consciousness to go on ‘Viewing all 
objects, unremittingly | In disconnection dead and spiritless.’
 (Willey 28) (W. Wordsworth, Exc iv. 957–8)
While some of Wordsworth’s texts may represent late-eighteenth-century 
reactions against the mechanistic philosophy of Descartes, Newton, 
and the eighteenth-century natural philosophers that succeeded them, 
these texts also demonstrate the influence of the systems and methods of 
Enlightenment education and enquiry. This paper argues that the images 
and ideas of the cabinet and virtuoso make useful symbolic representations 
of sites of intellectual and spiritual debate in his texts.
   To bring Willey’s insights into the context of recent critical theory, we 
can read this tension in Wordsworth’s texts not only in the historical 
context of intellectual history, but through several poststructuralist writers 
of knowledge theory.
   Late twentieth-century scholarship has elaborated Wordsworth’s 
relationship to the Enlightenment, and the shifting ground of history in his 
poetry (Bewell; Liu). Following from Alan Liu’s poststructuralist approach, 
we can read the tensions between scholasticism and naturalism in 
Wordsworth through the different kinds of history described by Michel 
Foucault (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”). Foucault illuminates 
the  difference  between  traditional  ‘history’  and  what  he  terms 
‘genealogy’—that is, a painstaking examination of ‘what history has 
despised or neglected’ (Payne 17). Genealogy does not repudiate history, 
but opposes ‘history’s determined search for origins’ and the notion that 
‘origins can be recovered’ (Payne 18). This theory illuminates the types of 
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knowledge at work in The Prelude, since the text demonstrates repeated 
concerns  for  the  search  for  origins  and  essence;  at  the  same  time,  it 
demonstrates  careful  observation  of,  and  abundant  subtleties  and 
differences  within,  and  between,  self  and  world.  The  text  also 
demonstrates an awareness of the intellectual, economic, political, military, 
and other power structures at work in the societies that shape the 
narrator’s development.
Classification in Wordsworth: Words and Things
   Wordsworth’s  texts  contain  ambiguous  and  shifting  arguments 
regarding the role of observation, classification, and the unity or selfhood 
of  individual  organisms.  Michel  Foucault’s  examination  of  the 
development of classification in natural history during what he terms the 
‘Classical’ period (equivalent to northern European late Renaissance and 
Baroque, ca.1540–1740), questions some longstanding assumptions and 
conclusions in the history of thought (Foucault, Order of Things). A detailed 
re-examination  of  the  scholastic-naturalistic  dialectic  traced  in 
Wordsworth by Willey requires an examination of these assumptions and 
conclusions.
   Foucault begins by critiquing the position of historians such as Willey 
who
believe that they can discover the traces of a major conflict between a 
theology that sees the providence of God and the simplicity, mystery, 
and foresight of his ways residing beneath each form and in all its 
movements, and a science that is already attempting to define the 
autonomy of nature. They also recognize the contradiction between a 
science still too attached to the old pre-eminence of astronomy, 
mechanics, and optics, and another science that already suspects all 
the irreducible and specific contents there may be in the realms of 
life. (Foucault, Order of Things 138)1)
1 ) According to this rationalist, progressive reading of scientific development, the 
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Foucault’s enquiry bears on the debate about the nature and definition of 
Romanticism at the end of the eighteenth century. With relevance to 
Wordsworth, Foucault argues that scholastic, Cartesian, and Newtonian 
epistemes before the eighteenth century are ‘alien’ to the sciences of 
evolution and the ‘notion of organism’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, instead of representing a continuity of thought (Foucault, Order 
of Things 139). Nor did the latter arise from the former through an intuitive 
assumption (in hindsight) that the complex arises from the simple—the 
‘strange richness’ of the world investigated by the biological sciences 
growing out of the ‘laws of rectilinear movement’ (Foucault, Order of 
Things 139).
   Instead, Foucault argues convincingly for the development of natural 
history out of a new gap ‘between things and words’—a development in 
representation.2) This paper suggests that Wordsworth’s texts do not 
express concern over ‘new’ scientific methods in the abstract, but that they 
express repeated unease from an awareness that these methods relate to 
the  eighteenth-century  shifts  in  representation  through  which 
Wordsworth’s texts comes into existence: the observation of the human 
and natural worlds, and their recording in linear verse.
‘Mechanism and theology’ of scholasticism and Early Modern Cartesian 
thought becomes opposed by ‘irreligion and a. . . confused intuition of life’ 
which ‘is supposed to have provided the still obscure and fettered endeavours 
of the eighteenth with their positive and rational fulfilment in a science of life 
which did not need to sacrifice rationality in order to preserve in the very quick 
of its consciousness the specificity of living things, and that somewhat 
subterranean warmth which circulates between them—the object of our 
knowledge—and us, who are here to know them’ (Foucault, Order of Things 
138).
2 ) ‘The division, so evident to us, between what we see, what others have 
observed and handed down, and what others imagine or naïvely believe, the 
great tripartition, apparently so simple and so immediate, into Observation, 
Document, and Fable, did not exist. And this was not because science was 
hesitating between a rational vocation and the vast weight of naïve tradition, 
but for the much more precise and much more constraining reason that signs 
were then part of things themselves, whereas in the seventeenth century they 
become modes of representation’ (Foucault, Order of Things 140–1).
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   Therefore, we can read the arguments and conflicts that arise in the 
Prelude texts below more productively than against the dialectic of 
scholasticism and naturalism described by Willey, if we consider that 
representation, at the end of the eighteenth century, had started to isolate 
the ‘thing’—the object of the poet or philosopher’s gaze—from its own 
history, by stripping away the accumulated language associated with the 
thing, that established its being to observers, going back to the Middle 
Ages:
Until the mid-seventeenth century, the historian’s task was to 
establish the great compilation of documents and signs—of 
everything, throughout the world, that might form a mark, as it 
were. It was the historian’s responsibility to restore to language all 
the words that had been buried. His existence was defined not so 
much by what he saw as by what he retold, by a secondary speech 
which pronounced afresh so many words that had been muffled. 
(Foucault, Order of Things 142)
In contrast, the legacy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would 
be the development of a purely descriptive language, an attempt to ‘see 
things as they are’.3) In the retrospective theoretical framework proposed 
for the Lyrical Ballads, the Preface asserts that the poet should attempt a 
task something like the natural historian’s: that is, to observe nature (‘the 
entire world of nature’) and human life (‘the great and universal passions 
of men’) by seeing and hearing, and then recording these observations in 
the clearest possible language (the ‘real language of men’) (Gill 608).
   Foucault brings to this analogy the realisation that such a new kind of 
seeing, such a ‘purification’ of descriptive language, did not depend on 
seeing, for the first time, a rich natural world that was previously invisible 
until illuminated by a rational, meticulous language that grew out of 
3 ) ‘Let good men feel the soul of Nature | And see things as they are’ (Jordan 
ll.954–5).
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advances in optics and mechanics (Foucault, Order of Things 142–4). On the 
contrary, the new kind of seeing that arose with natural history depended 
on seeing less, rather than seeing more. The work of natural history from 
the late seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries was, from Foucault’s 
perspective, to
reduce this distance between them [things and language] so as to 
bring language as close as possible to the observing gaze, and the 
things observed as close as possible to words. Natural history is 
nothing more than the nomination of the visible. Hence its apparent 
simplicity. . . (Foucault, Order of Things 144)
Thus with a similar thrust as his argument regarding history vs. genealogy, 
Foucault reminds us that the scholars of classical Greece and Rome, and 
the Middle Ages, did not suffer from inattentiveness or myopia. The 
ineffective historian’s privilege asserts the benevolence of hindsight: the 
rise of human achievement out of a steadily accumulating wisdom and 
steadily more accurate methodologies.
   Instead, the revolution of Enlightenment naturalists lay in the 
narrowing of the field of vision.4) Foucault also notes that this reductionism 
or deliberate narrowing of the field of vision applies to the optical tools of 
scientific advance during this period also—a point to remember when we 
4 ) ‘Natural history did not become possible because men looked harder and more 
closely. One might say, strictly speaking, that the Classical [i.e. Enlightenment] 
age used its ingenuity, if not to see as little as possible, at least to restrict 
deliberately the area of its experience. Observation, from the seventeenth 
century onward, is a perceptible knowledge furnished with a series of 
systematically negative conditions. Hearsay is excluded, that goes without 
saying; but so are taste and smell, because their lack of certainty and their 
variability render impossible any analysis into distinct elements that could be 
universally acceptable. The sense of touch is very narrowly limited. . . which 
leaves sight with an almost exclusive privilege, being the sense by which we 
perceive extent and establish proof, and, in consequence, the means to an 
analysis partes extra partes acceptable to everyone: the blind man in the 
eighteenth century can perfectly well be a geometrician, but he cannot be a 
naturalist’ (Foucault, Order of Things 144–5).
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read that the Dwarf Man virtuoso in Prelude Book 5 uses telescopes.5) 
Therefore, we can read some of the tensions and antipathies in the 
Wordsworth texts below as part of a larger uneasiness running through 
the sciences and literature of the late eighteenth century, in which the 
language of the poetry in The Prelude simultaneously becomes possible 
through the Enlightenment gap in representation (systemizations and 
exactitudes of observation and description), and through this language 
discovers the ability to express a longing for the other, earlier sort of 
history: the totalizing description, the attention to the organism as a whole, 
the history of a thing as the thing itself.
   The poetry of Prelude Book 2 perceptively locates its antagonist in the 
early museum or natural history collection. As Foucault describes:
At the institutional level, the inevitable correlatives of this patterning 
[i.e. classifying plants and animals according only to their external 
characteristics] were botanical gardens and natural history 
collections. And their importance, for Classical culture, does not lie 
essentially in what they make it possible to see, but in what they hide 
and in what, by this process of obliteration, they allow to emerge: 
they screen off anatomy and function, they conceal the organism, in 
order to raise up before the eyes of those who await the truth the 
visible relief of forms, with their elements, their mode of distribution, 
and their measurements. (Foucault, Order of Things 150)
The argument of the text, in describing classification systems and their 
weaknesses, thus often becomes caught between the new clarity of 
observation possible in the visible world, and the intuited ‘invisible world’ 
of individual organisms, and the continuities between them (W. 
5 ) ‘[It] was the same complex of negative conditions that limited the realm of 
experience and made the use of optical instruments possible. To attempt to 
improve one’s power of observation by looking through a lens, one must 
renounce the attempt to achieve knowledge by means of the other senses or 
from hearsay’ (Foucault, Order of Things 145).
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Wordsworth, 1805 Prel vi.536).
   In summary: read through Willey’s dialectic of scholasticism and 
naturalism, and Foucault’s ideas of genealogy, natural history, and 
representation, these examples that follow of cabinets and virtuosos in The 
Prelude show how these passages deploy the cabinet and virtuoso as 
reversible symbols of the tension between scholasticism and naturalism 
(empirical science), between supernaturalism and realism, and between 
history and genealogy, in order to represent the poet’s hopes for self-unity 
and self-knowledge in the text. The text of Book 2 opposes Wordsworth’s 
assertion that the soul is difficult to analyse because it ‘Hath no beginning’ 
against a symbol (the ‘cabinet of sensations’) that embodies as much of a 
denial of beginnings (objects separated from their sources, contexts, and 
Litteraria) as it does of meticulous scientific analysis.6) To use Roland 
Barthes’ term, the texts of these passages are excitingly ‘reversible’, 
because the contradictions they embody allow the reader to engage with 
the problems raised in Wordsworth’s argument—to further the argument 
in ways that Wordsworth cannot.
The Kunstkammer and Mechanistic Philosophy
   In contrast to Foucault, Horst Bredekamp makes a more gradualist 
argument. Bredekamp offers evidence from the history of collecting and 
cabinets to show that the historicization of natural history, and the 
6 ) Liu demonstrates how texts such as The Prelude can attempt to use ‘nature’ as a 
mirror to reflect the self and occlude history, but the bones of history 
nevertheless poke through the georgic landscape. In my analysis of Prelude 
passages below, Wordsworth does not attempt to interpose a mirror of nature, 
but confronts the epistemes of natural history directly as a means of analysing 
his feelings of a debt to, and origin in, nature. This reading does not deny the 
concealing methods of subjectivity in Liu; to extend his metaphor, Wordsworth 
attempts to look at nature and his own mind through the lens of natural history 
and antiquity, but this lens exerts distorting as well as sharpening effects on the 
text. Sometimes these histories function as a mirror rather than a lens; at other 
times they function as a lens, but not the lens Wordsworth thinks it is (e.g. a 
historicizing telescope mistakenly used to look at a close-up object or set of 
objects, or a magnifying glass used to look at a landscape).
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development of Enlightenment philosophy, owe much to the collectors of 
Kunstkammern from 1540–1740. Bredekamp cites Kant’s division of natural 
history into Naturbeschreibung (nature study) and Naturgeschichte (natural 
history) in 1775 as a milestone of the historicization of natural history.7) 
Bredekamp argues:
Though the idea of expanding the notion of natural history to cover 
periods of time—as distinct from classical descriptions of nature 
limited to a particular space—seemed radical at the time, it was 
hardly new. It actually derived from visual observations that had 
been made with respect to the collections of the Kunstkammer for 
more than 200 years. (Bredekamp 8)
Bredekamp’s offers the thesis that the apparent disorganisation of the 
Kunstkammern partially masked their organisational methodologies, and 
their engagement with the development of historicity.
   Bredekamp argues that the cabinets’ interdisciplinary, transhistorical 
organisation—juxtaposing natural objects, antiquities, and modern 
machines—helped to inspire the development of modern natural history:
given their somewhat suggestive name—‘Cabinets of Art and 
Curiosities’—the Kunstkammern seemed to smack of the pre-scientific 
period and the bizarre, so that despite more recent efforts to 
restructure the collections, the natural philosophy aspect of their 
systematic organization was not apparent in the inventories and their 
underlying philosophies. Having built up an inventory of human 
technical and artistic skills in two distinct and disparate areas—
ancient sculpture and modern machines—these collections gave rise 
to a kind of dynamic historical reflection that penetrated even into 
7 ) Bredekamp cites Kant’s essay Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen [On the 
Different Races of Man] (1775) (Kant; Bredekamp 8). For an English edition of 
this essay, see for example Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader, ed. Emmanuel 
Chukwudi Eze (Blackwell, 1997) (Eze 38–48).
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the area of natural history. . . . the historicization of nature was 
already underway within the slope of the Kunstkammern from the 16th 
to the 18th centuries. (Bredekamp 9)
While Bredekamp disagrees with Foucault as to how the historicization of 
nature occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both Foucault 
and Bredekamp’s differing interpretations of the rise and fall of the 
Kunstkammer, and the corresponding rise of the natural philosopher, prove 
applicable in different ways to the reading of the Prelude passages below.
   However, Bredekamp’s analysis is particularly useful in that it offers 
an explanation for why Wordsworth equates the collector’s cabinet with 
Enlightenment science rather than eclectic scholasticism. Foucault suggests 
that the break with the heterogeneity of classification occurs through a 
discarding of accumulated or extraneous knowledge—the Litteraria—and a 
focus on limited visual description: a mode of perception fatal to the 
Kunstkammer. This would align the cabinet of curiosities with the pre-
scientific world, the world of scholasticism and superstition through 
which, as Willey argues, Wordsworth attempts to restore curiosity at, and 
wonder in, nature. If Wordsworth feels anxiety about the mechanisation of 
nature after Boyle and Newton, then we might think that any image of a 
Kunstkammer in his poetry would represent an intellectual preference for a 
pre-Newtonian scholasticism, or mixed scholastic-naturalistic epistemes, 
of the kind that appear in Bacon, Thomas Browne, and John Evelyn.
   Instead, we see the opposite; at least in Prelude Book 2, Wordsworth 
equates the basic metaphor of the human mind as a cabinet with a distaste 
for classification. Bredekamp’s theory offers an explanation: unlike 
Foucault, Bredekamp suggests that the Kunstkammer proved vital to the 
development of the thought of Kepler, Descartes, and Locke (Bredekamp 
37–45). Bredekamp describes the automata and machines collected in 
Kunstkammern as inspiration for the idea of God as mechanikos or ‘divine 
clockmaker’ (Bredekamp 39). He cites Kepler’s delight in a display of 
automata in 1598; the writing of Henri de Monantheuil in the court of 
Henri IV; and perhaps most importantly, Descartes 1647 remark, ‘Je ne 
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reconnois aucune difference entre les machines que font les artisans [et] les 
divers corps que la nature seule compose’ (I can see no difference between 
machines made by artisans and the various things created by nature alone) 
(Bredekamp 39).8)
   Bredekamp then traces how images of Descartes frequently appeared 
in Kunstkammern and paintings representing the diversity of natural 
philosophy. Towards the end of the seventeenth century Johann Daniel 
Major, in his treatise on cabinets, described humanity as ‘the finest of 
nature’s clockworks’, and how human curiosity, embodied in the desire to 
collect, ‘represented a bridge in time leading back to, or beyond, the 
blissful state of knowledge that had existed prior to the Fall’ (Major §5, 
p.A4v.) (in Bredekamp 40). Similarly, John Locke uses the metaphor of 
filling a collector’s cabinet as an alternative description to the tabula rasa:
the Understanding is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from 
light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible 
Resemblances, or Ideas of things without; would the Pictures 
coming into such a dark Room but stay there, and lie so orderly 
as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the 
Understanding of a Man, in reference to all Objects of sight, and the 
Ideas of them. (Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding bk. 
II, ch. xi, §17, p.72) (cited in Bredekamp 41)
The  strong  connections  between  the  Kunstkammer  and  Cartesian 
mechanism—hints of which appear in Prelude Books 2 and 5—thus 
explains Wordsworth’s antipathy to the cabinet. In turning back from 
mechanistic philosophy towards the spiritual unity of scholasticism, 
Wordsworth finds enemies in the Kunstkammer and the utilitarian virtuoso, 
as symbols of the beginning of the end of unmediated human contact with 
nature. Through diachronic, syncretic or heterogeneous readings of the 
8 ) Bredekamp cites René Descartes, Les Principes de la Philosophie, in his Oeuvres (9 
vols., Paris, 1978) (Descartes).
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disorganised cabinet and the classified museum, the pedantic virtuoso and 
the virtuoso man of business, Wordsworth finds an enemy in both sides of 
the scholastic-naturalistic dialectic for the same reasons: both have lost 
touch with the truths of nature and the human spirit.
   In summary: on the one hand, Foucault’s interpretation of the rise of 
classification during the seventeenth century suggests one source for 
Wordsworth’s anti-cabinet, anti-museum anxieties in Prelude Book 2 
below—a desire for self-unity and a dynamic engagement with nature, 
rather than one that is entirely visual, synchronic, and fixed (and therefore 
‘dead’). On the other hand, Bredekamp’s contrasting interpretation does 
not allay these anxieties in the text, but adds another dimension. In looking 
to scholasticism for solace or inspiration, Wordsworth’s discovers anxiety 
towards antiquity as a mediator in his experience of nature, because a 
passion for historicized antiquity gave rise to the achievements of Kepler, 
Descartes and Locke—to mechanism. The image of the ‘disorganised’ 
Kunstkammer or early museum whispers to Wordsworth that nature, 
antiquity, art, and machines are co-dependent forces in humanity’s search 
for self-knowledge.
The Character of the Virtuoso
   Just as images of cabinets and museums appear occasionally at key 
moments in Wordsworth’s texts, so too appear images of the cabinet’s 
owner—the collector, the antiquary, or the polymath philosopher. Willey 
describes how seventeenth-century metaphysicians such as Sir Thomas 
Browne (admired by Coleridge and read by Wordsworth) represent 
liminal figures in the British transition from scholasticism to naturalism, 
the mechanism of which Foucault describes as occurring through changes 
in representation. During the Renaissance and seventeenth century, the 
archetypal cultural figure that embodied this transition was the collector of 
rarities or virtu—the virtuoso. Walter Houghton confronted the complex 
definition and shifting identify of the virtuoso over two centuries in a 
definitive short study in the 1940s.
   Houghton notes that the character of the virtuoso has been difficult to 
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define since its first use in English in the seventeenth century.9) Writers 
apply the term to art collectors (the ‘connoisseurs’ of the eighteenth 
century); antiquaries; and natural philosophers—yet not as discrete 
categories of virtuosi.10) Houghton’s identification of social class and 
socioeconomic utility as factors bearing on the definition of the virtuoso 
have important repercussions for the criticism levelled at the modern 
virtuoso or polymath in Prelude Book 5:
the virtuoso is clearly a man of wealth and leisure: he is a gentleman, 
and we shall see that the movement was strongly class-conscious. 
But he is also a student. Whatever the subject, it is not a mere 
accomplishment, or an occasional recreation; it is a study to which he 
devotes much of his time, and in which he is, or pretends to be, 
something of an authority. And finally, his studies are never devoted 
to utilitarian ends, no more to political or professional success than 
to commercial gain. (Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 53–4)
Houghton also describes how, from the start, users of the term ‘virtuoso’ 
demonstrated awareness that the term could be applied to both able and 
inept enquirers into nature—a division that could be used to divide the 
dilettantes from the ‘sincere’ philosophers (Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 54).11)
9 ) (Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 52) Henry Peacham imports the Italian term into 
English in 1634, to describe ‘princely minds’ (Peacham XII, p.105). John Evelyn 
uses the term in his diary on 1 March 1644 (Evelyn II, p.114) (cited in OED).
10) ‘The range of interest precludes any definition of virtuosity based on subject 
matter. All we can say is that paining, antiquities, and science are the major 
concerns, though in saying so, we must not assume that therefore we have 
three distinct types of the virtuoso. The character of Mary Astell is not merely a 
natural scientist, he is also an antiquary: “his Cash consists much in old Coins, 
and he thinks the Face of Alexander in one of ’em worth more than all his 
Conquests.” The normal case indeed would include the study of all three 
subjects’ (Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 53).
11) ‘There is no study more becoming a rational creature than that of natural 
philosophy; but, as several of our modern virtuosi manage it, their speculations 
do not so much tend to open and enlarge the mind, as to contract and fix it 
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   Houghton presses beyond the binary division between the natural 
philosopher as a scholar devoted to utility and economy, and the virtuoso 
as a scholar devoted to knowledge for its own sake, by asking what kind 
of intrinsic knowledge is at stake in the virtuoso’s profession. Following 
Bacon, Houghton concludes that, to the virtuoso,
Coins or pictures, shells or insects, none are valued for use, neither 
for the advancement of learning nor for immediate gain: they are 
valued in themselves because they arouse curiosity and stimulate 
delight; and because their knowledge or collection guarantees a 
social reputation. (Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 56)
Thus utility, and historical and scientific value, while sometimes important 
to the virtuoso, ‘was subordinate to personal incentives’ (Houghton, 
“Virtuoso 1” 56–7). By this definition, the Dwarf Man in Prelude Book 5 
below can be classed as a virtuoso, despite his pretensions to utility, 
because  the  text  asserts  his  motivating  principle  is  ‘Vanity’ (W. 
Wordsworth, 1805 Prel v. 354).12) Wordsworth, despite staking his financial 
hopes on the success of his brother John’s employment with the East India 
Company, generally aligns himself against utility and commerce in texts 
written from 1793–1805. Based on tone and sensibility, the Dwarf Man 
virtuoso satirised in Prelude Book 5 is less a virtuoso than a diversified man 
of business; yet based on his accomplishments, reputation, and motives, he 
is the heir to the seventeenth-century dilettante virtuoso.
upon trifles’ (Addison and Steele No. 236, 12 October 1710).
12) Houghton makes the subtle distinction that ‘the virtuoso is not at bottom a man 
whose wealth and leisure allow him to become a ‘philosopher’ (the case of 
Boyle). He is fundamentally a man for whom learning is the means to dispose 
of wealth and leisure in the happiest fashion—and with the comforting 
assurance that he may also be serving the desiderants of philosophy, history, 
or art. The study of virtuosity is therefore a study in sensibility. We have to trace 
historically the origin, growth, and decline of a subjective approach to learning; 
which means that the ultimate clue is often the tone of voice’ (Houghton, 
“Virtuoso 1” 57 my emphasis).
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   The second part of Houghton’s study concludes with the important 
reflection that satires against virtuosos in the seventeenth century 
depended upon the existence of extreme cases, and that ‘the solid 
intellectual core [of virtuosity]. . . tended to be overlooked’ (Houghton, 
“Virtuoso 2” 214). This point supports Bredekamp’s analysis of the 
productive links between sixteenth- and seventeenth-century collectors, 
their Kunstkammer, and the rise of natural philosophy. Although a 
Society of Virtuosity was founded in 1689, the figure of the respectable 
virtuoso was already in decline by 1700 (Cust 6–7, in Houghton 214). 
Satires against learning damaged the successful amateur scholars along 
with the lunatic fringe.13) Houghton praises the movement as a whole for 
its role in ‘disseminating. . . Renaissance culture among the aristocracy, 
and [transforming] the “degenerous gentleman” of the Tudors, with his 
passion for hawks and his contempt for knowledge, into the educated 
Cavalier’ (Houghton, “Virtuoso 2” 214).
   A century later, the opinions on virtuosos and polymaths expressed in 
Wordsworth’s texts reflect a confusion of sentiments: the optimistic 
Baroque movement, the satires against it, and an eighteenth-century 
counter-movement against anti-intellectualism. As Houghton concludes, 
satire contributed less to the death of seventeenth-century virtuosity than 
its own success did. By 1667 Sprat attested that ‘Trafic and Commerce have 
given Mankind a higher Degree than any Title of Nobility, even that of 
Civility and Humanity itself’ (Sprat 408, in Houghton “Virtuoso 2”, 215).
   Similarly, Locke’s Thoughts Concerning Education (1693) concerns itself 
not with the gentleman of leisure, but with ‘what ought to be the proper 
Study of a. . . Man of Business in the World’ (Locke, Education §172, p.217). 
Locke’s treatise grudgingly accepts the usefulness of Newton’s Principia 
(§182), along with arithmetic, geography, chronology, and history (§168–
13) For example, Sir William Temple writes that ‘the Learned began to fear the 
same Fate [as the Pedants], and that the Pidgeons should be taken for Daws, 
because they were all in a Flock: And because the poorest and meanest of the 
Company were proud, the best and the richest began to be ashamed’ (Temple 
70).
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§173), though it seems indifferent to natural philosophy (§181); it suggests 
that a little Euclid provides more that enough geometry (§171).14) Locke 
reviles poetry as a pastime and profession, and declares ‘I am not for 
Painting’, on the grounds that it is a sedentary activity, and too difficult to 
learn well (Locke, Education §165, pp.206–9; §191, pp.243–4).15)
   Baroque philosophy and experiment had produced a wealth of direct 
applications to commerce and war. Locke’s treatise on education aims to 
solidify these gains by modernizing the aristocratically ‘disgraceful Names 
of Mechanick and Trade’ (Locke, Education 250). Philosophy, arts, and 
literature—all are necessary sacrifices to a practical age. Sprat anticipates 
that in the modern world, ‘whither the greatest Trade shall constantly flow, 
the greatest Riches and Power will be establish’d’ and observed that other 
European powers were already ‘bent upon the advancing of Commerce, as 
the best means. . . to enlarge their Empire’ (Sprat 408).
   The early eighteenth century reaped the fruits of this utilitarian 
narrowing (a decline relevant to the debate on liberal arts education in the 
early twenty-first century). Authors well known to Wordsworth, including 
Shaftesbury and Swift, commented on the ‘fashionable flight from 
learning’ (Houghton, “Virtuoso 2” 216). Even Shadwell, whose satire The 
Virtuoso had fired one of the loudest salvos against curiosity without 
utility, warned of the consequences of the unilateral victory of commerce 
and gallantry. As Houghton points out, Shadwell reserves his greatest 
criticism in the play for the gallants, who ‘laugh at any Gentleman that has 
Art or Science’ (Houghton, “Virtuoso 2” 217). Longvil and Bruce, the 
sensible young gentlemen of the play, open Act 1 by lamenting the 
14) Locke writes, ‘the first six books of Euclid [are] enough for him to be taught. For 
I am in some doubt, whether more to a Man of Business, be necessary or useful’ 
(Locke, Education §171, p.216).
15) ‘if [a child] has no Genius to Poetry, ’tis the most unreasonable thing in the 
World, to torment a Child, and waste his time about that which can never 
succeed: And if he have a Poetick Vein, ’tis to me the strangest thing in the 
World, that the Father should desire, or suffer it to be cherished, or improved’ 
(Locke, Education §165, p.207).
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foolishness of their own class and generation.16) Longvil jokes that
if they go on as they begin, the Gentlemen of the next Age will scarce 
have Learning enough to claim the benefit of the Clergy for Man-
slaughter. (Shadwell 3)
Authors  known  and  loved  by  Wordsworth,  including  Swift  and 
Shaftesbury, drew attention to this crisis of education in the first decades 
of the eighteenth century. In the Characteristicks—which Wordsworth had 
likely read from by 1785, during his school days—Shaftesbury laments the 
poor choice facing youth, between ‘Pedantry and School-Learning’ on the 
one hand, ‘which lies amidst the Dregs and most corrupt parts of antient 
Literature’, and on the other hand, ‘the fashionable illiterate World’ 
(Houghton, “Virtuoso 2” 216–7; Cooper I, part 3, 333–4n).17) Negotiation 
between  these  two  unenviable  paths  influences  Wordsworth’s 
representation of the Dwarf Man virtuoso in Prelude Book 5 below.
Literary and Biographical Contexts
   Unlike friends and colleagues such as Francis Wrangham, Southey, 
Coleridge, and Walter Scott, Wordsworth lacked the time, the financial 
means, and the stable living situation that would have allowed him to 
amass a collection of books or curiosities. Yet Wordsworth remained a 
‘collector’ of curiosities and antiquities (including objects and ideas from 
16) ‘Longv[il]. Lucretius! Divine Lucretius: But my Noble Epicurean, what an 
Unfashionable Fellow art thou, that in this Age, art given to understand Latine? 
| Bruce. ’Tis true, Longvil, I am a Bold Fellow to pretend to it, when ’tis 
accounted Pedantry for a Gentleman to spell, and where the Race of Gentlemen 
is more degenerate than that of Horses’ (Shadwell 2).
17) Shaftesbury professes, ‘I am persuaded that to be a Virtuoso (so far as befits a 
Gentleman) is a higher step towards the becoming a Man of Virtue and Good 
Sense, than the being what in this Age we call a Scholar. For even rude Nature 
it-self, in its primitive Simplicity, is a better Guide to Judgment, than improv’d 
Sophistry, and pedantick Learning’ (Cooper I, part 3, 333–4). This passage 
likely influenced the formation of Wordsworth’s definitions of, and judgment 
of, the terms ‘virtuoso’ and ‘scholar’.
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what we would now class as anthropology, archaeology, ethnology, 
natural history, folklore and mythology, and the natural sciences), 
throughout his life, through the medium of his poetry. In addition to 
mentioning antiquities and curiosities themselves in his poems, he also 
makes several metaphorical references to the ‘cabinet’—specifically 
meaning the Kunstkammer or Wunderkammer—in his poetry.
   Wordsworth uses the metaphor of the collector’s cabinet twice in The 
Prelude. Firstly, in the second part of the two-part Prelude of 1799, he uses 
the analogy of the cabinet to question the appropriate methods of analysis 
of the history of his own mind. He concludes that modern philosophical 
(scientific) methods are insufficient ‘to analyse a soul’. This passage 
becomes a part of Book 2 of the 1805 Prelude (ii. 203-37). Secondly, Book 3 
of the 1805 Prelude concludes with a summary of Wordsworth’s Cambridge 
education using the analogy of the cabinet as the field of knowledge 
through which he roved, experiencing and feeling much but retaining 
perhaps little (iii. 644-68). 
   All  of  The  Prelude’s  references  to  cabinets  and  museums  are 
metaphorical. When Wordsworth uses the image of the ‘cabinet’ and 
‘museum’ in The Prelude, what did he have in mind? Did he base these 
images on any cabinets and museums that he had actually seen, or did his 
imagination depend on descriptions and prints in books? The history of 
the Kunstkammer and the virtuoso stretches over two and a half centuries 
before Wordsworth’s birth, and the ambiguity of the term makes it all the 
more relevant to Wordsworth’s conflicting feelings about scholasticism 
and science.
   As Houghton demonstrates, the seventeenth-century term ‘virtuoso’ 
could apply equally to antiquaries; art collectors; amateur naturalists and 
geologists; and proponents of the New Science at the Royal Society, such 
as Boyle and Hooker (Houghton, ‘Virtuoso Part 1’ 52). Similarly, as 
Bredekamp convincingly suggests, the Kunstkammer’s blending of natural 
and antiquarian objects with the latest machines and tools reflected the 
interests of collectors, meaning that the virtuoso would not identify 
themselves solely as an antiquary or natural philosopher. The cabinet, the 
322
collector, the antiquary, and the virtuoso occupied a rapidly shifting 
ground that changed the focus of study solely from scholastic fields such 
as divinity, literature, antiquities, and metaphysics, towards experimental 
philosophy in the middle decades of the seventeenth century (Houghton, 
“Virtuoso 1” 72–3).18)
Cabinets in Literature: Wordsworth’s Literary Context
   The rapidly multiplying concepts applied to terms such as ‘cabinet’, 
‘antiquary’, and ‘virtuoso’ over the course of the seventeenth century 
produces confusion during the decline in their popularity over the 
eighteenth century. Even if Wordsworth saw no cabinets of curiosities or 
museums in person before he finished the 1805 Prelude, he would have 
read these terms in poetry and prose. While the cabinet itself remained 
generally the same—the Kunstkammer or Wunderkammer, a miscellany of 
rare and curious objects from natural history, antiquity, and natural 
philosophy—the proportion and focus of different kinds of objects in any 
real or imagined cabinet would vary widely between 1600 and 1800, and 
so would the epistemological implications attached to them.
   Images of cabinets of curiosities appear in the Wordsworthian milieu 
from 1790–1805 in texts by authors including George Dyer (1700?–1758), 
Henry Jones (1721–1770), Horace Smith (1779–1849), and Samuel Rogers 
(1763–1855). Dyer’s The Fleece—a poem likely well known to Wordsworth 
since his schooldays—uses an image of African seashells destined to be 
acquired ‘For Pond’s rich cabinet, or Sloan’s’: references to painter and 
antiquary Arthur Pond (bap.1701–1758) and collector Sir Hans Sloane 
(1660–1753).19) Like Dyer, Jones’ Isle of Wight uses the metaphor of nature 
18) Thus: ‘The range of interest precludes any definition of virtuosity based on 
subject matter. All we can say is that painting, antiquities, and science are the 
major concerns. . .’ (Houghton, “Virtuoso Part 1”, 53).
19) ‘At solemn distances its pillars rise, | Sofal’s blue rocks, Mozambic’s palmy 
steeps, | And lofty Madagascar’s glittering shores, | Where various woods of 
beauteous vein and hue, | And glossy shells in elegance of form, | For Pond’s 
rich cabinet, or Sloan’s, are found’ (Dyer iv. 260–5). Though Wordsworth does 
not refer to the poem by name until 1811, Wu suggests that he ‘must have 
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as a cabinet stored with treasures to satisfy both utility and fancy.20) 
Smith’s epistolary ‘To a Lady’ is a thank-you note for a ‘little God of Love 
| Dug from Pompeii’, and envisions a Roman cabinet of antiquities and 
ancient learning; the poet imagines that the original owner’s mansion 
might have displayed ‘The choicest stores of classic taste’ while ‘her rich 
cabinets outpour’d | A constant feast of Intellect’ (Smith 208–10, ll.12, 15–
16).
   Furthermore, two important images from Coleridge’s work resonate 
with the cabinet and museum metaphors of The Prelude. Firstly, though 
assembled long after the Prelude, Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria (1817) 
uses the word ‘museum’ as the equivalent of a holy place or sanctuary, in 
the context of sincere versus petty literary criticism.21) Secondly, in an 
important connection between Wordsworth and the influences of 
sympathetic Enlightenment thinkers, Coleridge effuses on the character of 
Sir Thomas Browne in one of his few surviving letters to Sara Hutchinson 
on 10 March 1804. Coleridge describes Browne as ‘a feeling heart conjoined 
with a mind of active curiosity,’ and adds,
Fond of the Curious, and a Hunter of Oddities & Strangenesses, 
while he conceived himself with quaint & humourous Gravity a 
useful inquirer into physical Truth & fundamental Science, he loved 
to contemplate & discuss his own Thoughts & Feelings, because he 
known this poem since his schooldays’ (Wu, WR 1800-1815 83).
20) ‘The world shall find thee and with wonder tell, | That Vecta’s shining scenes 
the world excel; | Thou precious cabinet where nature locks, | Her richest 
gems within thy beauteous rocks; | Thou casket fill’d with all her choicest store, 
| Of matter freely, but of fancy more. . .’ (Jones ll.172–7).
21) The vindictive critic ‘ceases to be a CRITIC, and takes on him the most 
contemptible character to which a rational creature can be degraded, that of a 
gossip, backbiter, and pasquillant: but with this heavy aggravation, that he 
steals the unquiet, the deforming passions of the World into the Museum; into 
the very place which, next to the chapel and oratory, should be our sanctuary, 
and secure place of refuge; offers abominations on the altar of the muses; and 
makes its sacred paling the very circle in which he conjures up the lying and 
prophane spirit’ (ii.xxi.119).
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found by comparison with other men’s that they too were curiosities: 
& so with a perfectly graceful & interesting Ease he put them too into 
his Musaeum and Cabinet of Rarities—. (Griggs ii. 1081)
   Considering that Coleridge was an active bibliographic antiquary, both 
of these references are not only metaphorical, but strong in human feeling. 
Neither uses images of the cabinet of curiosities or museum in the overtly 
critical way that appears in The Prelude.
Cabinets and Museums: The British Museum
   Beyond his reading, Wordsworth perhaps had little access to actual 
cabinets, museums, and collections of curiosities before 1805. During his 
brief residence in London in 1790 and during other early visits, he may 
have seen cabinets or collections of ‘curiosities’ or ‘wonders’ on display as 
popular exhibitions (Altick). The tourist’s itinerary of London from Prelude 
Book 7 does not mention the British Museum, but Wordsworth may have 
visited Montagu House, the original building on the museum’s current site 
in Russell Square. If he had, he would have found it an uninspiring and 
claustrophobic experience, very much in line with his description of the 
‘Cabinet | Or wide Museum’ of his analogy in Book 3. The museum’s 
holdings were growing rapidly along with the British Empire, and even by 
the mid-eighteenth century, Montagu House had become inadequate to 
store and display the collections. Wordsworth could have seen the 
museum’s natural history collections if he visited the British Museum in 
1790, although no evidence suggests he did. The regular open access to the 
public described in 1814 was nothing like the shambles of admission by 
ticketed tour from the 1770s to 1805 (Synopsis xxxii–xxxiii; Shelley 57–62).22) 
22) We must not imagine the accessibility of the British Museum to Wordsworth 
by current or even Victorian standards. According to an early twentieth century 
summary of the museum’s history, in the late eighteenth century, ‘Admission 
to the galleries of antiquities and natural history was at first by ticket only on 
application in writing, and limited to ten persons, for each of three hours in the 
day. Visitors were not allowed to inspect the cases at their leisure, but were 
conducted through the galleries by officers of the house. The hours of 
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Texts: the two Prelude cabinets
   With the theoretical, historical, biographical, and literary contexts in 
mind, let us turn to the two passages from The Prelude. In the first example, 
Wordsworth uses the analogy of the ‘cabinet of curiosities’ in order to 
critique classification, and praise Coleridge as one to whom ‘The unity of 
all has been revealed’. He writes, probably in mid-to-late 1799:
 But who shall parcel out
His intellect by geometric rules,
Split like a province into round and square;
Who knows the individual hour in which
His habits were first sowed, even as a seed;
Who that shall point as with a wand and say,
This portion of the river of my mind
Came from yon fountain? Thou, my Friend, art one
More deeply read in thy own thoughts, no slave
Of that false secondary power by which
In weakness we create distinctions, then
Believe our puny boundaries are things
Which we perceive and not which we have made.
To thee, unblinded by these outward shews,
The unity of all has been revealed,
And thou wilt doubt with me, less aptly skilled
Than many are to class the cabinet
Of their sensations and in voluble phrase
Run through the history and birth of each
As of a single independent thing. (Parrish ii. 242–61)
Here Wordsworth praises Coleridge’s self-knowledge (using a metaphor 
admission were subsequently extended; but it was not until the year 1810 that 
the Museum was freely accessible to the general public for three days in the 
week, from ten to four o’clock’ (A General Guide to the British Museum (Natural 
History) 102).
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of books), and follows his example to ‘doubt’ that his ‘sensations’ 
(described a few lines later as both his ‘general habits and desires’ and 
‘each  most  obvious  and  particular  thought’)  can  be  classed  as 
‘independent’ objects in a metaphorical cabinet of curiosities.
   If Wordsworth’s objective in the nascent Prelude is recollection leading 
to self-knowledge, then this passage argues that the methodology of the 
collector—whether virtuoso, antiquary, or natural philosopher—is 
insufficient to describe the human ‘mind’ or ‘soul’. Wordsworth’s analogy 
contradicts the seventeenth-century idea of the collector as a natural 
philosopher seeking to recover Edenic knowledge (as in Johann Daniel 
Major), or the rational man collecting ‘Pictures’ to fill a dark cabinet (as in 
Locke’s Essay).23) The 1799 text implies that experience can be collected, but 
not classified. Analysis of the soul, while perhaps possible, is a ‘Hard task’; 
contrary to Descartes and Locke, the Prelude makes clear that such analysis 
cannot depend on the ‘false secondary power’ by which scholars and 
philosophers alike ‘create distinctions’.
   In the 1805 Prelude, the passage from 1799 remains in Book 2, and 
makes the same general argument. However, Wordsworth strengthens the 
language of part of the passage, explicitly naming the object of the text’s 
critique as ‘Science’:
 Thou, my Friend! art one
More deeply read in thy own thoughts; to thee
Science appears but, what in truth she is,
Not as our glory and our absolute boast,
But as a succedaneum, and a prop
To our infirmity. Thou art no slave
23) Bredekamp argues that from the sixteenth century, books on mechanics had 
nurtured the belief that humankind could return to its state of Edenic 
perfection, by impressing the right kinds of knowledge onto the tabula rasa of 
the post-Fall mind: ‘The Kunstkammer became a metaphor for the human brain 
gradually reacquiring Edenic wisdom’ (Bredekamp 40–1).
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Of that false secondary power. . . (1805 Prel ii. 215–221)24)
Though raised in the empirical tradition of Enlightenment thought—
reading and studying Euclid, Bacon, Locke, and hearing parts of Descartes 
from Coleridge25)—Wordsworth here resists a central effect of empirical 
classifying systems, the ‘distinctions’ and ‘puny boundaries’ of perception. 
Foucault’s argument aligns with the Prelude’s here in the acknowledgment 
that these boundaries were ‘made’ during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, through shifts in representation, rather than instinctively 
perceived.
   In both the 1799 Prelude and 1805 Prelude versions of this passage, the 
metaphorical Kunstkammer represents, on Willey’s dialectic, naturalism 
rather than scholasticism. Yet by describing ‘the cabinet | Of. . . sensations’ 
as a Kunstkammer rather than a museum classified by the system of a 
Buffon or a Linnaeus, the text ironically conflates excessive empiricism 
with the scholasticism of the antiquary and the anti-Baconian virtuoso—
the Gimcrack devoted to curiosity as an end in itself. Wordsworth’s 
cabinet in Book 2, like the idea of the Kunstkammer itself, serves as an 
unstable symbol that takes on an epistemological role imposed by its 
subjective observer. In the early nineteenth century, the virtuoso’s cabinet 
draws criticism from the Prelude for the same reason it drew praise in the 
24) Wordsworth’s use of ‘succadaneum’ (a substitute) is interesting, both as a 
modern Latin ‘scientific’ term, and for the fact that during the eighteenth 
century the term could be misused to mean ‘A remedy, cure’, or ‘A drug, 
frequently of inferior efficacy, substituted for another’ (OED, definitions 3 and 
2). These latter definitions are equivalent to ‘a prop | To our infirmity’, which 
would make the whole expression a hendiadys. This reading offers a different 
meaning from the idea that ‘Science’ serves as a direct ‘substitute’ for ‘our glory 
and our absolute boast’—other concepts that might include, for W in 1805, 
direct experience, nature, human faith, etc. Apart from hearing the term in 
conversation with Coleridge or others, W might have seen it in Goldsmith’s 
History of the Earth, cited in the OED (Goldsmith i. 238). 
25) W’s copied quotations from Descartes, dating from ca. February 1801, ‘do not 
imply serious study of Descartes by W’ but influenced the Arab Quixote 
passage in Prelude Book 5 (Wu, WR 1800-1815 74; Abrams, Wordsworth, and 
Gill 158n4). See also (J. Wordsworth 194).
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: as an inspiration to mechanistic 
philosophy.26) This is the diametric reason for which it was criticised in the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: as a site of temporal and 
spatial confusion; unhistoricized natural history; and curiosity over utility.
   Let us juxtapose this first analogy of the collector’s cabinet against the 
second. At the end of Book 3 of the 1805 Prelude, Wordsworth summarises 
his retrospective on his Cambridge education by using another metaphor 
of the collector’s cabinet or early museum. He writes:
 Carelessly
I gaz’d, roving as through a Cabinet
Or wide Museum (throng’d with fishes, gems,
Birds, crocodiles, shells) where little can be seen
Well understood, or naturally endear’d,
Yet still does every step bring something forth
That quickens, pleases, stings; and here and there
A casual rarity is singled out,
And has its brief perusal, then gives way
To others, all supplanted in their turn.
Meanwhile, amid this gaudy Congress, framed
Of things, by nature, most unneighbourly,
The head turns round, and cannot right itself;
And, though an aching and a barren sense
Of gay confusion still be uppermost,
With few wise longings and but little love,
26) In his festive Gesta Grayorum (1594), Francis Bacon enumerates the four 
essential resources for the study of philosophy. The first and second are a 
library, and a botanical and zoological garden. The third is ‘a goodly huge 
cabinet, wherein whatsoever the hand of man by exquisite art or engine hath 
made rare in stuff, form, or motion; whatsoever singularity, chance, and the 
shuffle of things has produced; whatsoever nature hath wrought in things that 
want life and may be kept, shall be sorted and included. . . .’ The fourth is a ‘still-
house, so furnished with mills, instruments, furnaces, and vessels as may be a 
palace fit for a philosopher’s stone. . .’ (Bacon viii. 334–5).
Wordsworth’s Cabinets and Virtuosi 329
Yet something to the memory sticks at last,
Whence profit may be drawn in times to come. (1805 Prel iii. 649–69)
In these lines Wordsworth writes of his education as he writes of his 
childhood reading in Book 5: as a source of ‘delight’, pursued ‘Carelessly’ 
as a person walking through a ‘Cabinet | Or wide Museum’.
   The varied objects in this cabinet produce a range of emotional 
responses, all ephemeral. The cabinet, like the associating human mind, or 
the poetic metaphor, juxtaposes objects that would not normally relate to 
each other in a ‘real’ or ‘natural’ environment; the cabinet is an artificial 
space, ‘framed | Of things, by nature, most unneighbourly’ (1805 Prel iii. 
662–3). The text describes Wordsworth’s education using the metaphor of 
the Kunstkammer; the reader’s experience of this metaphor resembles 
poetry or metaphor itself—that is, the cabinet is a concept or sign that links 
unfamiliar things by spatial juxtaposition, as metaphor links unrelated 
things through linguistic juxtaposition.
   But what kind of philosophical methodology, or what kind of 
epistemology, does this second cabinet or museum represent? Again, the 
image is unstable. Compared to the metaphorical ‘cabinet | Of sensations’ 
in Book 2, this cabinet or museum is clearly a virtuoso’s cabinet or 
heterogeneous seventeenth- or eighteenth-century Kunstkammer, rather 
than a modern museum subdivided by field, with rigorously classified 
exhibits—as the Ashmolean and the British Museum were slowly, but 
gradually, becoming. Wordsworth’s description sounds remarkably like 
the experience of a visit to the British Museum in 1790, with ticket-holders 
rushed through a dazzling array of ‘unneighbourly’ exhibit cases, with 
little  or  no  explanation,  a  place  ‘where  little  can  be  seen | Well 
understood’.
   A simple reading of this passage would state that the text recounts the 
experience of viewing a Kunstkammer or museum through early-to-mid-
eighteenth century sensibility. The cabinet or museum in this passage is 
not outdated—in the sense that Wordsworth describes a collection of the 
sort that existed in 1790 or 1803–5 in Cambridge, Oxford, London, and 
330
elsewhere. The cabinet of Book 3 is the stereotypical cabinet of Shadwell’s 
Virtuoso and subsequent satires against pedantry that dominated the 
eighteenth century. It accurately describes the confused state of exhibits 
and museums around 1790–1805.
   However, in the context of the cabinet metaphor in Book 2, the cabinet 
or museum in Book 3 seems unusual because it is not outdated. Book 3 
faintly praises the dusty eighteenth-century cabinet for its failings, whereas 
Book 2 condemns the seventeenth-century cabinet for its successes. In 
Book 2 Wordsworth looks further back, to what Houghton calls the golden 
age of the virtuoso, and the period during which the Kunstkammer’s 
conflation of time and space—according to Bredekamp—inspired the 
development of historicity and methodology, rather than unfocused 
curiosity and ‘a barren sense | Of gay confusion’ (Bredekamp 37–45). In 
Book 3, the Kunstkammer of Wordsworth’s Cambridge education stands in 
the text as a gentle, wry testament to scholasticism (at best), or pedantry (at 
worst)—the pedantry Shaftesbury warns of in 1711. Wordsworth’s 
Cambridge education inspires ‘few wise longings and but little love,’ but 
an experience from which ‘something to the memory sticks at last, | 
Whence profit may be drawn in times to come’. As a young reader of 
Shaftesbury, Wordsworth is not now defending the path of pedantry, but 
remains frankly representing the confusion of English university education 
during the rapid transition from scholasticism to naturalism, from Aristotle 
and Aquinas to Bacon and Newton.
   Thus the Kunstkammer of Prelude Books 2 and 3, taken together, show a 
historical sleight-of-hand at work, a conflation worthy of the Kunstkammer 
itself. Returning to Prelude composition in early 1804 after a break of more 
than three years, Wordsworth destabilises the symbolic meaning of the 
cabinet between Books 2 and 3. The simple reading of Book 3 sketched 
above is insufficient, because the ‘cabinet | Of sensations’ passage in Book 
2 clearly demonstrates that in 1799 Wordsworth associated the cabinet 
with the flexible experimental philosophy of Bacon and the empiricism of 
Locke, even if he did not have direct experience of the work of Descartes, 
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Tournefort, Linnaeus, Buffon, etc.27) By early March 1804 reflecting on his 
Cambridge experience, Wordsworth feels more affection for classical 
learning and Cambridge’s scholasticism than he did in 1789; or at least the 
text expresses this affection, particularly in one long effusion before the 
image of the cabinet that closes the book (1805 Prel iii. 459–91). The 
Kunstkammer thus becomes the spatially and historically heterogeneous 
collection of the amateur virtuoso, and the text finds the confidence to 
locate some value in its disarray and ‘gaudy Congress’.
Virtuosos, Nature, and Fancy: the Arab-Quixote and the Dwarf 
Man in Prelude Book 5
   In contrast to the examples of cabinets in Books 2 and 3, Prelude Book 5 
explicitly expresses Wordsworth’s epistemological goal, as the text 
explores the relationships between literature and lore, science (in the sense 
of all learning, both scholastic and naturalistic), human life, and nature. In 
Book 5, Wordsworth wishes, on behalf of a future ‘race of real children’, 
for ‘Knowledge not purchased with the loss of power’ (1805 Prel v. 449). 
Book 5 of the 1805 Prelude makes a useful case study for the thesis that 
Wordsworth’s images of cabinets, collecting, virtuosity, and related forms 
of intellectual enquiry provide important insights into his development 
and self-conception as a poet. The readings below argue that the two 
contrasting examples of unusual virtuosos in Book 5 show the text’s 
refusal to reject scientific naturalism outright, but to weigh it equally with 
poetry, playful experience of nature, and the materials of fantasy or fancy.
27) Wordsworth does not appear to have known the Lichfield Botanical Society’s 
translations of Linnaeus (the society was established by Erasmus Darwin for 
this purpose): A System of Vegetables (1783–5) and The Families of Plants (1787). 
However, he knew Erasmus Darwin’s verse epics, The Loves of the Plants (1789) 
and The Economy of Vegetation (1792)—which popularized the Linnaean 
system—alluding to them in his early publications An Evening Walk and 
Descriptive Sketches (1793) (Wu, WR 1770-1799 44; Darwin). W would possibly 
also have been exposed to Linnaean botany through reading Cook’s voyages; 
Daniel Solander (1733–82), Linnaeus’ student, accompanied Cook and Joseph 
Banks on the Endeavour  voyage (1768–71) (Wu, WR 1800-1815  62; 
Hawkesworth).
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   Book 5, subtitled ‘Books’, contains some of the least book-ish episodes 
or ‘spots of time’ of The Prelude, including the Boy of Winander passage 
and the Drowned Man of Esthwaite. Yet it also contains two passages 
strongly connected to the idea of curiosities and miscellany; the collecting 
and preservation of different types of knowledge; and declining and 
emerging types of knowledge or epistemes. The first of these is the well-
known dream of the Arab Rider or Arab-Quixote (1805 Prel v. 49–165). 
This paper reads the Arab-Quixote as a conflated Orientalist and Western 
antiquary, attempting to preserve the most important knowledge inscribed 
on the post-Fall tabula rasa—mathematics and poetry—from destruction by 
a cataclysmic flood.
   The second passage, less frequently discussed, serves as parodic 
complement to the Arab Rider: Wordsworth’s portrait of the early-
nineteenth-century virtuoso and ‘Man of Business’ (to use Locke’s term 
above) as a ‘dwarf Man’, a ‘monster birth | Engendered by these too 
industrious times’ (1805 Prel v. 295, 292–3). This paper will conclude 
by comparing these two passages and asking: in the context of the 
Prelude’s arguments on tensions between scholasticism and naturalism—
and specifically on the Kunstkammer’s and the virtuoso’s role in the 
classification, organisation, and preservation of knowledge—how are these 
two fantastical portaits related?
   The dreaming Wordsworth (or Coleridge) encounters the Arab-Quixote 
carrying the treasures of a shell and a stone, symbolic of poetic and 
mathematical knowledge, to bury them for safekeeping against a 
cataclysmic flood. Critics have offered a number of reasons why the shell 
makes an apt dream-image for poetry, such as the way its spiral form 
(assuming that it is the sort of shell you can listen to, as the dreaming 
Coleridge does) relates to Wordsworth’s narrative style, as a ‘labyrinth of 
narrative repetition’; or how the shell is a metaphor for the idea of the 
poetic image itself—images as ‘the shells of things’ that must ‘re-originate 
their value repetitively’ (Miller 67, 95–9; Liu 351). But in the context of the 
Kunstkammer and the virtuoso, the shell is simultaneously an object from 
natural history (a seashell) and an artificial, possibly antiquarian object (a 
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book of poetry). Both of these classes of objects appear together in the 
collector’s cabinet, uncategorised by field of knowledge or point of 
historical origin. In Coleridge’s dream, they fuse into a single symbol. 
   In this way the Arab-Quixote resembles the seventeenth- or eighteenth-
century virtuoso, equally devoted to poetry and natural philosophy. Both 
halves  of  the  Arab-Quixote’s  character  relate  to  the  work  of  the 
Kunstkammer and the virtuoso. Cervantes’ hero served as a preeminent 
example of the satirised antiquary, the amateur scholar of chivalry out of 
place  in  the  modern  world  (and  gradually  out  of  his  own  mind) 
(Cervantes).28) As an avid reader of Akenside, Wordsworth may have 
known that poet’s short poem The Virtuoso (which appeared two years 
after Wordsworth completed the 1805 Prelude), which specifically makes 
this association. The poem concludes by warning:
The wight [the Virtuoso] whose brain this phantom’s power [Phantasy’s]
 doth fill,
On whom she doth with constant care attend,
Will for a dreadful giant take a mill,
Or a grand palace in a hogsty find:
(From her dire influence me may Heaven defend!)
All things with vitiated sight he spies:
Neglects his family, forgets his friend,
Seeks painted trifles and fantastic toys,
And eagerly pursues imaginary joys. (Akenside 237–9, ll.82–90)
Thus if we look at the Arab-Quixote from the perspective of collecting and 
virtuosity, the mysterious rider not only counts as something of a virtuoso 
(from his devotion to both arts and sciences) but also as a kind of mad 
collector or hoarder.
   Considering the dream image has been twice appropriated (from 
28) Wordsworth’s copy of Cervantes, avidly read since childhood, was probably 
the 1782 four-volume translation by Smollett (Wu, WR 1770-1799 26).
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Descartes by Coleridge, and from Coleridge by Wordsworth) this 
particular fantastical collector particularly suits the ambiguous epistemes 
and aesthetics of the 1805 Prelude. Firstly, Cervantes’ Quixote is not a 
collecting antiquary after the first pages of the novel, but an antiquary who 
enters into the world as if it were his collection. Like Wordsworth’s persona 
in Book 5, Quixote values fantasy—he just fails to define why he does so, 
as Wordsworth struggles to do. Even though he does not collect objects, 
Quixote is brought down by the weight of his accumulated chivalric texts 
on his mind: the imbalance between text and world.
   Secondly, the Arab rider seems to be a Bedouin nomad. The Bedouin, 
from the European chivalric perspective, epitomised ‘travelling light’; the 
dream-Bedouin has concentrated the essential post-Fall knowledge into a 
stone and a shell, and carries them along with his lance—just three objects. 
I would suggest therefore that, from the perspective of the Kunstkammer 
and the virtuoso, the Arab-Quixote makes an ideal character for 
Wordsworth: a traveller capable of preserving and transmitting large 
quantities of culture and knowledge, while remaining highly mobile, and 
transient between geographies and cultures.
   Finally, in this passage we can see the first connection between this odd 
collector and the other major passages in Book 5. The symbol of the ‘Shell 
| Of a surpassing brightness’ literally relates to the ‘deluge now at hand’ 
that approaches with its ‘glittering light’ (1805 Prel v. 80–1, 99, 129). Poetic 
prophecy heralds apocalypse, and this motif (seashell and sea) connects 
this episode to the Boy of Winander and the drowned man of Esthwaite 
through the images of water and sound.
   The motif of sound and orality has a strong presence in Book 5. In the 
context of the argument of this paper, this sound imagery contrasts with 
the self-limiting, visual frame of reference of the modern classification 
system, as described by Foucault above (Foucault, Order of Things 144–5). 
Furthermore,  in  Foucault’s  theories  of  history,  the  Arab-Quixote 
exemplifies a danger we can identify throughout The Prelude, namely the 
dream of futurity, of closure—the difference between a particular, 
unidentified book of poems with all its shortcomings and errors (a book 
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tethered to particular history by its Litteraria), and ‘A loud prophetic blast 
of harmony’ in ‘an unknown Tongue’: the abstract notion of poetry itself, 
the logos (1805 Prel v. 96, 94). The former, ‘real’ object can serve as ‘effective 
history’, while the latter cannot.
   Finally, let us consider the second virtuoso in Prelude Book 5. The 
subsequent portrait of what the ‘virtuoso’ has become in the late 
eighteenth century—natural philosopher, dilettante, moralist, and man of 
commerce—produces a complex response to the ‘Arab Phantom’ and 
‘Semi-Quixote’. Wordsworth describes the Arab-Quixote in the language 
of the melancholy seventeenth-century virtuoso: the collector, natural 
philosopher, or antiquary whom curiosity or reason—the quest for 
knowledge or Baconian ‘rule’—has led astray. The voice of Wordsworth in 
Book 5 admits that he has
 felt
A reverence for a Being thus employed,
And thought that in the blind and awful lair
Of such a madness, reason did lie couched. (1805 Prel v. 149–52)
In other words, Wordsworth finds method in the madness of the dilettante 
virtuoso who takes, as his ultimate goal, the preservation of knowledge for 
its own sake. 
   On the one hand, in Foucault’s terms, we might read this as Book 5 
advocating a kind of genealogy—the preservation of the history of human 
work with all its errors and digressions, its accumulated Litteraria. On the 
other hand, as described above, while the dream-stone represents a 
particular book (Euclid’s Elements), the dream-shell represents poetry in 
the abstract—a kind of history and literature antithetical to the collecting 
methodologies of the Kunstkammer as Bredekamp describes.
   In contrast, the portrait that follows represents a caricature of the 
waking world, the character of a late-eighteenth-century intellectual. The 
text comes to this portrait with hesitant language, and after a number of 
digressions—including returning to the question of whether Wordsworth 
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has chosen the right subject for his epic, instead of a more fanciful subject, 
‘some tale | That did bewitch me then, and soothes me now’ (1805 Prel v. 
178–9).
Finally, the text begins, in a confessional tone:
 My drift hath scarcely,
I fear, been obvious; for I have recoiled
From showing as it is the monster birth
Engendered by these too industrious times.
Let few words paint it: ’tis a Child, no Child,
But a dwarf Man; in knowledge, virtue, skill;
In what he is not, and in what he is,
The noontide shadow of a man complete. . . (1805 Prel v. 290–8)
Here immediately we see that the text includes the word ‘virtue’, in the 
Dwarf Man’s stunted or incomplete ‘knowledge, virtue, skill’; in this 
context, the word ambiguously represents both human virtue (as in ethics) 
and the virtu of the virtuoso, that is, an understanding of historical, 
scientific, and aesthetic worth and rarity.
   Wordsworth addresses the Dwarf Man’s attitudes to fear, with a direct 
reference to the dream of the Arab-Quixote:
He is fenced round, nay armed, for aught we know
In panoply complete; and fear itself,
Natural or supernatural alike,
Unless it leap upon him in a dream,
Touches him not. (1805 Prelude, v. 314–8)
Using the classical or chivalric word ‘panoply’, the text indicates that, 
metaphorically, the Dwarf Man wears full armour: a Greek hoplite or 
crusading knight, in contrast to the robes of the Arab-Quixote.
   After  satirising  the  moral  perfection  of  this  product  of  the 
Enlightenment, Wordsworth turns to the Dwarf Man’s knowledge and 
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reading:
 in learning and in books
He is a prodigy. His discourse moves slow,
Massy and ponderous as a prison door,
Tremendously embossed with terms of art;
Rank growth of propositions overruns
The Stripling’s brain; the path in which he treads
Is choked with grammars; cushion of Divine
Was never such a type of thought profound
As is the pillow where he rests his head. (1805 Prel v. 319–27)
In a move that Willey and Houghton would identify with Locke, and 
Foucault with the Baroque shift in representation from words to things, 
here poetry has descended to ‘discourse’. The mouth of the Arab-Quixote’s 
shell has become the mouth of a prison, sealed by the language of the 
listener; the rider’s rapid passage ‘o’er the Desart Sands’ (assumed to be 
rapid, if it can outrun the ‘fleet waters of the drowning world’) becomes a 
path ‘choked with grammars’. Not only does the symbolic shape of 
knowledge shift from nature (desert, stone, and shell) to town or ruin 
(prison, embossed door, weed-choked path), but the site of the encounter 
with knowledge shifts from nature to society. Even the waking-world site 
of dreams shifts: the chamber of the philosopher or ‘Divine’ takes the place 
of Coleridge’s ‘rocky cave | By the sea-side’ (1805 Prel v. 325, 57–8).
   As the caricature continues, it becomes clear that Book 5 is making an 
argument with a solid understanding of the shift in the character of the 
virtuoso from the late seventeenth to the late eighteenth century, along the 
lines  of  growing  focus  on  utility  and  ‘business’  as  described  by 
Houghton—and, perhaps as a consequence of almost two centuries of 
parody and satire. Book 5 portrays the utilitarian natural philosopher as a 
dilettante whose diverse knowledge belies a lack of understanding or 
‘common sense’. In this context, ‘common sense’ is a quality paradoxically 
rooted in materials of fancy, useless knowledge, and error: what Foucault 
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would classify as the materials of genealogy or ‘effective’ history.
   At first glance, Wordsworth’s Dwarf Man appears to celebrate the 
‘Romantic’ virtuoso’s diversity of knowledge, the very unity of natural 
philosophy and literature to which Wordsworth and Coleridge aspired for 
their epic poetry. As Wordsworth wrote to James Tobin on 6 March 1798:
I have written 1300 lines of a poem in which I contrive to convey 
most of the knowledge of which I am possessed. My object is to give 
pictures of Nature, Man, and Society. Indeed I know not any thing 
which will not come within the scope of my plan. 
(De Selincourt and Shaver 212)
This wide-ranging curiosity, bordering on enthusiasm, and a Faust-like 
thirst for completeness of understanding—a trait that Wordsworth shares 
with Coleridge—thus seems to turn the 1804 satire of the Dwarf Man 
against Wordsworth and his own poetic project of 1798.
   But Wordsworth is not satirising himself; rather, the text of Book 5 
offers a coordinated criticism of ‘emergent’ history, as opposed to 
genealogy, as the narrator confronts how crucial aspects of his own mind 
formed out of digression, fantasy, fancy, and error. The ‘moral part’ of the 
Dwarf Man ‘Is perfect’, and he is immune to fear, except in dreams. These 
qualities lay the groundwork for the critique even as they draw praise 
from the text. Wordsworth describes the Dwarf Man’s learning in the 
language of natural philosophy, commerce, colonialism, and voyages of 
discovery:
The Ensigns of the Empire which he holds,
The globe and sceptre of his royalties,
Are telescopes, and crucibles, and maps.
Ships he can guide across the pathless sea,
And tell you all their cunning; he can read
The inside of the earth, and spell the stars;
He knows the policies of foreign Lands;
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Can string you names of districts, cities, towns,
The whole world over, tight as beads of dew
Upon a gossamer thread; he sifts, he weighs;
Takes nothing upon trust: his Teachers stare,
The Country People pray for God’s good grace,
And tremble at his deep experiments. (1805 Prel v. 328–40)
Here the ‘Empire’ is knowledge of nature and society—but does not 
include any study proscribed by Locke’s Thoughts Concerning Education 
(art, literature, moral philosophy). There is not even a mention of history, 
only geography. This is purely Willey’s ‘naturalism’ rather than 
‘scholasticism’, just as it is Foucault’s visual grid that names (‘spell the 
stars’, ‘Can string you names’) by cutting off or ignoring all history before 
historicity. The ‘Ensigns’ or symbols of the Dwarf Man’s authority are the 
tools of the natural and human sciences. His knowledge is Faustian in its 
completeness, though the term is inaccurate here, since the Dwarf Man 
scoffs at all fields that enticed Marlowe’s Faust, all fields discarded by the 
triumph of naturalism: poetry, folklore, myth, art, music, and magic. These 
arts are the domain of superstition and fancy—the domains of error.
   Read through Foucault, to which of the incompatible universes of pre- 
and post-Enlightenment epistemes does the Dwarf Man belong? Is he an 
Aristotelian or Cartesian virtuoso, focused on optics and experimental 
philosophy (the chymistry of ‘crucibles’), and dismissive of natural history 
because of its amorphousness, its totalizing equation of an object and its 
Litteraria, its entire history through time? Or is he an Enlightenment 
virtuoso, the child of Newton and Locke, placing nature under the grid of 
classification? He seems to be the latter; his telescopes—and consequently 
his knowledge of navigation and astronomy—suggest his reliance on the 
visual, and his aptitude for the revealing limitations on field of view 
imposed by optical instruments (Foucault, Order of Things 145).
   However, problematically, the Dwarf Man ignores natural history 
entirely, even agronomy, so central to the growth of British trade during 
the Industrial Revolution. Why does the Dwarf Man seem to have no 
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interest in natural history—the birds and crocodiles of Wordsworth’s 
metaphorical university-museum? The ‘gossamer thread’ on which the 
dwarf Man strings the ‘beads of dew’ of global geographic nomenclature 
represents a classification system with two interesting properties. Firstly, 
the gossamer implies silk (if not specifically spider silk) or some other 
natural animal or vegetable material, in a period before synthetics could 
try to out-boast nature. This is the only image of organic nature in the 
whole passage; the Dwarf Man treats the ‘pathless sea’ as a transport 
medium, ignoring its contents, and delineates geography on a political and 
demographic, rather than topological or ecological, basis. Secondly, the 
Dwarf Man uses a one-dimensional table to classify two-dimensional 
human geography through a three- or even four-dimensional natural 
history.
   I believe the textual choice of ‘thread’ rather than ‘threads’ is not at all 
arbitrary; the Dwarf Man ‘Can string you names’, that is, enter data into a 
table linearly. This metaphor capably conveys how descriptive writing, in 
both science and art, renders multiple dimensions linear.29) So: could this 
threat be a one-dimensional representation of a two-dimensional spider 
web? If so, it provides a neat analogy to the Enlightenment grid of 
classification, whether the cartographer’s lines of latitude and longitude, 
or the grid of the Linnaean ‘System’ of botanical structure (Foucault, Order 
of Things 152).
   But this seems awkward. A more likely reading, following the tone of 
the text, sums the Dwarf Man’s disinterest towards both natural history 
and organism, and his linear classification system, into a calculated attack 
29) ‘By means of structure, what representation provides in a confused and 
simultaneous form is analysed and thereby rendered suitable to the linear 
unwinding of language. In effect, description is to the object one looks at what 
the proposition is to the representation it expresses: its arrangement in a series, 
elements succeeding elements. . .  . Natural history is a science, that is, a 
language, but a securely based and well-constructed one: its propositional 
unfolding is indisputably an articulation; the arrangement of its elements into a 
linear series patterns representation according to an evident and universal 
mode’ (Foucault, Order of Things 148).
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by Wordsworth’s persona on the early nineteenth-century ‘virtuoso as man 
of business’ that relates the ‘virtues’ of economic power, leisure, and utility 
to the perceived failings—the limitation of the field of vision, the 
inattention to the organism and the individual—of naturalism as a whole. 
According to Foucault, the seventeenth century de-privileged four senses 
in order to privilege the visual; Prelude Book 5 parodies this closing-down 
of perception in service of classification by reducing the visual dimensions 
available to the observing natural philosopher, over the course of one 
passage, from three (‘globe’, ‘inside of the earth’) to two (‘maps’, ‘pathless 
sea’, ‘stars’) to one (‘gossamer thread’).
   The link between virtuosity and utility was not new, even in the 
eighteenth century. Until at least the 1620s, advice on the formation of 
the character of the English virtuoso emphasised ‘the English ideal of 
public service’ and ‘laid predominant stress on study for use’ (Houghton, 
“Virtuoso 1” 60, 59). Even Castiglione’s advice to the courtier ‘makes no 
appeal to curiosity. . . studies [poetry, art, engineering, antiquities] are not 
valued in themselves’ (Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 60). But Houghton notes 
the changes in economics and politics in the early seventeenth century that 
provided the wealth and leisure necessary for the rise of the Enlightenment 
virtuoso:
Without the enclosures and the destruction of the monasteries, 
American gold and silver, monopolies and joint stock companies, the 
virtuoso could not have existed. (Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 61)
Consequent upheavals in social class put the aristocracy on the defensive; 
the character of the new virtuoso thus also embodied class-consciousness, 
and a desire to preserve class distinctions.30) 
30) ‘Special forms of learning, hardly obtainable without wealth and leisure, take 
on the urgency of class distinction in an age notorious for intruding upstarts 
and ambitious merchants; so that knowledge of painting, blazon of arms, coins 
and statues become the marks of a gentleman. . .’ (Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 63). 
Houghton cites Peacham’s advice that gentlemen learn heraldry in order to 
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   Writers such as Timothy Bright and, more famously, Thomas Burton, 
also encouraged gentlemen to study the arts and sciences in order to 
combat one of the main Jacobean maladies related to excessive wealth and 
leisure, namely, melancholy.31) We might assume that the ever-active, ever-
diligent Dwarf Man virtuoso resists melancholy as effectively as he resists 
fear, even as he walks in the metaphorical shadow of the gothic ‘prison 
door’ of his own discourse, and on a similarly gothic path of enquiry, 
‘choked’ and ‘Rank [with] growth’.
   Therefore, the Prelude’s portrait of the Dwarf Man serves as a character 
assassination against the virtuoso as ‘man of business’. Rather than 
standing for or against seventeenth- and eighteenth-century virtuosity, the 
text advocates one kind of virtuoso over another. The caricature of the 
Dwarf Man strengthens its polemic by excluding from the modern 
virtuoso’s sphere of learning two things sacred to Wordsworth: books and 
nature. Even if the Dwarf Man does not read poetry or romance, he reads 
voraciously (‘in learning and in books | He is a prodigy’). Even if he does 
not play in nature, he would no doubt appreciate its commercial value, 
and classify it. By hyperbolizing, or we might say, by compressing the 
virtuoso into the parody of the Dwarf Man, the text draws attention to the 
fields of knowledge in contention between Wordsworth’s scholastic and 
naturalistic epistemes, between the Kunstkammer and the modern 
classification grid, between the classical virtuoso and the utilitarian 
virtuoso.
   One subtle method by which the text accomplishes this sleight-of-hand 
is by conflating nature and books. Earlier in Book 5, Wordsworth has 
‘discerne and know an intruding upstart, shot up with the last nights 
Mushroome, from an ancient descended & deserved Gentleman, whose 
Grandsires have had their shares in every foughten field by the English since 
Edward the first’ (Peacham 154–5).
31) Burton recommends the study of both antiquities and natural philosophy 
(natural history, chemistry, astronomy, geometry, ‘ravishing’ algebra, 
engineering, etc.) to combat melancholy (Burton part 2, section 2, member 4). 
Bright recommends ‘no better remedy’ to melancholy than ‘the learning of 
some art or science’ (Bright 37, 297–8) (cited in Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 64).
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already used nature as a metaphor for the unplanned, ‘unscientific’ course 
of reading of his childhood and Coleridge’s, a metaphor in which the two 
friends are cattle grazing on the wild pasture of books. He sketches a brief 
georgic of reading:
Where had we been, we two, beloved Friend,
If we, in lieu of wandering, as we did,
Through heights and hollows, and bye-spots of tales
Rich with indigenous produce, open ground
Of Fancy, happy pastures ranged at will!
Had been attended, followed, watched, and noosed,
Each in his several melancholy walk,
Stringed like a poor man’s Heifer at its feed,
Led through the lanes in forlorn servitude;
Or rather like a stallèd ox shut out
From touch of growing grass; that may not taste
A flower till it have yielded up its sweets,
A prelibation to the mower’s scythe. (1805 Prel v. 233–45)32)
Similarly, after the Boy of Winander passage, Wordsworth will go on to 
describe his educational ideal, ‘A race of real children’ and plead: ‘May 
books and nature be their early joy!’ (1805 Prel v. 436, 447). Here, in the 
context of epistemology and the virtuoso, the ‘heights and hollows’, ‘bye-
spots of tales’, ‘indigenous produce’, and ‘open ground | Of Fancy’ are the 
texts and forms of knowledge available to the true virtuoso, the wanderer 
through nature and text (and nature as text)—the nomadic Arab-Quixote 
before his apocalyptic mission, sometimes aimless but always curious. 
Here ‘melancholy’, associated with the virtuoso, threatens the mind raised 
32) This passage presents fresh fodder for the reading of the ‘hunger-bitten girl’ 
and her cow in Book 10, as it connects poverty of reading with physical 
starvation. Similarly, Wordsworth’s use of the image of the mower’s scythe 
links the polemic of this passage to seventeenth-century poetry on both sides of 
the political spectrum (e.g. royalist and parliamentarian, Herrick and Marvell). 
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pedantically, the ‘Stringed. . . Heifer’ (a recurrence of the one-dimensional 
symbol). 
   Conversely, nature remains external to the Dwarf Man’s experience. 
He reads, but this reading has no relationship to nature, either as a 
metaphorically parallel experience of pleasure, or as a locus of activity. 
The catalogue of the Dwarf Man’s prodigious achievement ‘in learning 
and  in  books’  includes  grammar,  divinity,  astronomy,  chemistry, 
cartography and navigation, geology, politics, geography, and knowledge 
of ‘deep experiments’—presumably of chemical compounds, mechanics, 
and Cartesian reasoning. But with the exception of the stars, references to 
natural objects remain conspicuously absent. The metaphorical cabinet of 
this philosopher’s interests includes no fossils, seashells or coral, plants 
and seeds, teeth and bones; or any images, such as engravings, of such 
objects from natural history.
   This is no accident. We can contrast the Dwarf Man’s imagined closet 
or laboratory with the secluded home of the Solitary in Book 2 of The 
Excursion:
 What a wreck
We had about us! scattered was the floor,
And, in like sort, chair, window-seat, and shelf,
With books, maps, fossils, withered plants and flowers,
And tufts of mountain moss; and here and there
Lay, intermixed with these, mechanic tools,
And scraps of paper,—some I could perceive
Scribbled with verse: a broken angling-rod
And shattered telescope, together linked
By cobwebs, stood within a dusty nook;
And instruments of music, some half-made,
Some in disgrace, hung dangling from the walls. (Exc ii. 686–97)
Ten years before The Excursion, the absence of ‘fossils, withered plants and 
flowers, | And tufts of mountain moss’ in the imagined cabinet of the 
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Dwarf Man makes a polemical point regarding the status of life (including 
human life) as organism, as Litteraria, as a conflation of nature and book. 
The  Solitary’s  closet  notably  contains  fragments  of  art  as  well  as 
philosophy: poetry and musical instruments. It also contains an ‘angling-
rod’, a referent that signifies both nature and art to Wordsworth, since in 
Prelude Book 5 he represents his enjoyment of his father’s ‘golden store of 
books’ as inseparable from the experience of reading outdoors, while 
fishing:
 Full often through the course
Of those glad respites in the summer-time
When, armed with rod and line we went abroad
For a whole day together, I have lain
Down by thy side, O Derwent! murmuring Stream,
On the hot stones and in the glaring sun,
And there have read, devouring as I read,
Defrauding the day’s glory, desperate!
Till, with a sudden bound of smart reproach,
Such as an Idler deals with in his shame,
I to my sport betook myself again. (1805 Prel v. 505–15)
In the caricature of 1804, the text carefully creates a double absence that 
associates the two forms of knowledge absent from the Dwarf Man’s mind: 
nature and literature.
   Thus while the Dwarf Man represents a kind of virtuoso in Book 5—a 
natural  philosopher,  dilettante,  and  man  of  business  devoted  to 
understanding every aspect of the physical world around him and the 
human society that inhabits it—the text denies him both nature and books 
(in the sense of fanciful books such as poetry and romance) on the grounds 
that he does not deserve to appreciate them, or to even pretend to 
appreciate  them.  The  text  deploys  a  sleight-of-hand  to  suggest  a 
dependency between scholasticism and naturalism (in the form of fanciful 
antiquarian literature) even as it seems to condemn Cartesian mechanism 
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and Enlightenment naturalism for the myopia of ‘these too industrious 
times’.
   Nature  finally  enters  the  parodic  portrait,  as  a  site  of  loss.  The 
caricature continues:
All things are put to question; he must live
Knowing that he grows wiser every day,
Or else not live at all; and seeing, too,
Each little drop of wisdom as it falls
Into the dimpling cistern of his heart.
Meanwhile old Grandame Earth is grieved to find
The playthings, which her love designed for him,
Unthought of: in their woodland beds the flowers
Weep, and the river sides are all forlorn. (1805 Prel v. 341–9)
The text leaves it unclear as to whether ‘Grandame Earth’ offers the 
‘playthings’ of nature—the ‘flowers’ and ‘river sides’—to the philosopher 
as objects for his ‘deep experiments’, or merely for idleness and repose. But 
as Houghton suggests, the identification and description of the virtuoso in 
the seventeenth century requires judgments on grounds of sensibility and 
tone (Houghton, “Virtuoso 1” 57). Here, in the first years of the nineteenth 
century, Wordsworth’s text offers a warm pastoral to the insensible 
virtuoso. The personified images—weeping flowers and forlorn banks—
gesture to the pastoral tradition of classical and Early Modern poetry. But 
the Dwarf Man seems to neglect nature on scientific as well as aesthetic 
grounds. The text laments his lack of play in nature—an exhortation to 
one scholastic ideal—but denies his involvement even on the grounds of 
agriculture, livestock, and forestry. Thus the portrait of the Dwarf Man in 
Book 5 is a carefully managed representation of an anathema, as biased 
through omission as its contrary, the Arab-Quixote, is idealized.
   The conclusion of the caricature gives further evidence to the text’s 
manipulation of the representation of modernity. The final lines of the 
Dwarf Man portrait perform a neat substitution of fancy for nature:
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Now this is hollow; ’tis a life of lies
From the beginning, and in lies must end.
Forth bring him to the air of common sense,
And fresh and shewy as it is, the Corps
Slips from us into powder. Vanity,
That is his soul, there lives he, and there moves;
It is the soul of every thing he seeks;
That gone, nothing is left which he can love;
Nay, if a thought of purer birth should rise
To carry him towards a better clime,
Some busy helper still is on the watch
To drive him back and pound him like a Stray
Within the pinfold of his own conceit;
Which is his home, his natural dwelling-place.
Oh! give us once again the Wishing-Cap
Of Fortunatus, and the Invisible Coat
Of Jack the Giant-Killer, Robin Hood,
And Sabra in the Forest with Saint George!
The Child whose love is here, at least doth reap
One precious gain, that he forgets himself. (1805 Prel v. 350–369)
The Dwarf Man lives his ‘life of lies’ away from ‘the air of common sense’; 
he is trapped—in an image of eclogue that echoes the earlier georgic—‘like 
a Stray [sheep] | Within the pinfold of his own conceit, | Which is his 
home, his natural dwelling place’ (1805 Prel v. 350, 352, 361–3). Without 
nature, the horizons of the Dwarf Man’s explorations (travel ‘towards a 
better clime’) will be limited as a sheepfold’s, just as Wordsworth 
described an alternate childhood without free reign over his reading as 
being a ‘stallèd ox shut out | From touch of growing grass’.
   But as eclogue replaces georgic, a transposition occurs from nature 
to books of fancy and lore. In the former example (Wordsworth and 
Coleridge as young oxen), the signifier ‘nature’ refers to the concept ‘books’, 
creating the metaphor of ‘reading as grazing’. In the latter image, signifiers 
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that suggest ‘nature’ (‘air of common sense’, ‘better clime’) point to the 
concept ‘nature’ (the ‘playthings’ which the Dwarf Man ignores). But as 
a basic poststructuralist reading shows: in this latter metaphor, the ‘air of 
common sense’ and the ‘better clime’ that lead the thinker away from the 
sheepfold are themselves already concepts. What do the ‘air of common 
sense’ and the ‘thought of purer birth’ point to, as actual objects? By the 
end of the portrait, it becomes clear that the referents are not the actual 
images of nature neglected by the Dwarf Man, the ‘flowers’ and ‘river 
sides’.
   Rather, they are the non-existent objects of fancy and lore: the wishing-
cap of Fortunatus, the invisible coat of Jack the Giant-Killer, etc. We have 
come full circle, from the legacy of the virtuoso to the contents of the most 
fantastical Kunstkammern of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries—saints’ 
relics; fantastical natural objects like unicorns’ horns; and the penny books 
of eighteenth–century folk tales and nursery rhymes. The arguments of 
Prelude Book 5 subtly undermine many of the conclusions of mechanism 
and naturalism, while using the materials of the cabinet and the virtuoso 
to gesture towards their usefulness in productively uniting scholasticism 
and naturalism (which Bredekamp suggests was an essential aspect of 
their early methodologies). The Arab-Quixote is just a dream, but a dream 
of an unencumbered, Orientalist virtuoso, a man in whose ‘madness. . . 
reason did lie couched’. Similarly, the Dwarf Man caricature sets up a 
straw man of nineteenth-century virtuosity without natural history, in 
order to argue apparently for nature, but more passionately for fantasy.
   Wordsworth’s plea for the new intellectual child (‘not too wise, | Too 
learned, or too good’) at the end of this section of Book 5 mimics the thrust 
of Foucault’s concept of genealogy, the idea that ‘truth or being lies not at 
the root of what we know and what we are but the exteriority of accidents’ 
(Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 374). Foucoult’s idea of origin 
is not a solid foundation but ‘an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, 
and heterogeneous layers that threaten the fragile inheritor from within or 
from underneath’ (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 374). This is 
the legacy of the Kunstkammer, the idea that the imposition of the grid of 
Wordsworth’s Cabinets and Virtuosi 349
classification necessarily cleaves fissures and instabilities into knowledge 
as a whole, for the sake of advancement. 
   Wordsworth,  on  the  leading  edge  of  the  poetic  response  to 
developments in natural philosophy that would sweep through the 
nineteenth century, considers the formation of his childhood consciousness 
in Book 2, his education in Book 3, and his love of fancy and romance in 
Book 5. Through this self-examination, he locates a discrepancy between 
the philosophical principles that have formed his reasoning mind, and the 
materials and experiences that this mind values. In similar language to 
Foucault’s quotation above, Wordsworth enquires, regarding the ‘mighty 
workmen of our late age’ who strive to bridge ‘the forward chaos of 
futurity’:
 when will they be taught
That in the unreasoning progress of the world
A wiser Spirit is at work for us,
A better eye than theirs, most prodigal
Of blessings, and most studious of our good,
even in what seem our most unfruitful hours? 
(1805 Prel v. 370, 372, 383–8)
Conclusion
   In conclusion, while images of cabinets and museums, collectors and 
virtuosos, point to Wordsworth’s general resistance to categorised and 
‘scientific’ knowledge, they exhibit instability and reversibility as to 
whether this resistance is directed against classical methods of knowledge 
(the patterned chaos of scholasticism and superstition, embodied by the 
Kunstkammer or early museum) or modern ones (natural philosophy’s 
classifications and systematizations). Wordsworth seeks, as he writes in 
Book 5 of The Prelude, ‘Knowledge not purchased with the loss of power!’ 
(1805 Prel v. 449). This exhortation carries the desire for a totalising 
perspective, an objectivity that would require him to stand outside of 
knowledge itself. Yet it also carries with it a preference for not discarding 
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the minutiae and ‘errors’ of history—whether those of his culture and 
history, or his own experiences. Wordsworth’s resort to the metophors of 
the cabinet and the virtuoso keeps the problem of knowledge alive in the 
text, even as the poet repeatedly refutes the cabinet’s epistemological 
method as divisive and error-ridden, opposed to holistic ideas of the 
individual and the holistic organism.
   In the context of seventeenth-century thought, this reading affirms 
Basil Willey’s. Willey puts Wordsworth’s texts—like those of John Evelyn, 
Thomas Browne, Thomas Sprat, and Joseph Glanvill—on the fulcrum 
between scholasticism on the one hand, and empiricism and naturalism 
on the other.33) This paper has attempted to bring Willey’s reading into 
the context of current epistemological theory, and the rapid expansion 
of scholarship devoted to the Kunstkammer, the virtuoso (including 
the antiquary and the natural philosopher), and the scholastic milieu 
from which the modern epistemes gradually or rapidly emerged, in 
order to shed new light on particular unstable images in Wordsworth’s 
texts, and consider how they relate to the development of his creative 
imagination. From this perspective, a number of epistemological terms 
in Wordsworth’s poetry, including ‘cabinet’, ‘curiosities’, ‘antiquarian’, 
‘philosopher’, and ‘fancy’, can—as modern scholarship has taught us 
about the term ‘Romanticism’ itself—contain intrinsically heterogeneous, 
even contradictory meanings. Subsequent scholarship should explore 
these instabilities, in order to more fully develop an understanding of 
Wordsworth’s texts as some of the most notable products of tensions 
between pre-Cortesian scholasticism and pre-Kantian naturalism.  
33) See, as principle texts, Thomas Browne, Religio Medici (1642); Browne, 
Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1646); Browne, Nature’s Cabinet Unlock’d (1657); Thomas 
Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London (1667); Joseph Glanvill, The 
Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661); Glanvill, “The Agreement of Reason and Religion” 
in Essays on Several Important Subjects in phylosophy and Religion (1676).
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Abstract
   This paper examines examples of the language of the Kunstkammer or 
Wunderkammer (the collector’s cabinet of art, antiquities, ‘curiosities’, and 
‘wonders’), and the character of the ‘virtuoso’ (the collector, antiquary, 
connoisseur,  and  natural  philosopher)  and  its  parodies  in  William 
Wordsworth’s autobiographical epic poem, The Prelude (completed 1805). 
The paper uses a theoretical methodology based on ideas in Foucault’s The 
Order of Things and Horst Bredekamp’s The Lure of Antiquity and the Cult of 
the Machine. It further draws on the historical context of tensions between 
scholasticism and naturalism in the work of writers including Basil Willey, 
Walter Houghton, and John Brewer. Close readings of four passages in The 
Prelude related to cabinets and virtuosi then invite discussion of the text’s 
complex positions on nature, classification, and mechanistic philosophy in 
the context of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemologies. The 
paper argues that the images of the ‘cabinet’ and the ‘virtuoso’ are highly 
unstable signifiers in their historical contexts. These images allow the 
poem to simultaneously critique opposing forces in intellectual history. On 
the one hand, these images critique the naturalism of the ‘New Science’ of 
the Enlightenment—the legacies of Bacon, Kepler, Descartes, and Locke—
while making assumptions about its mechanistic and utilitarian goals, and 
its devotion to classifying and categorising objects and phenomena. On the 
other hand, these images also carry an implicit critique of the supernatural 
scholasticism  of  the  classical  and  pre-Early-Modern  periods,  which 
manifests in the late eighteenth century as retrograde antiquarianism, 
scientific  dilettantism,  and  the  character  of  the  myopic  antiquary  or 
collector. Here the text makes contrasting assumptions about the disorder, 
anti-historicism, and superstitions of the Kunstkammer as the prototypical 
museum. While the Prelude texts generally position Wordsworth against 
mechanistic  natural  philosophy,  in  favour  of  a  more  superstitious 
scholasticism,  they  simultaneously  display  a  methodical,  analytical 
Enlightenment mind at work. Through readings of passages of cabinets 
and virtuosos in Books 2, 3, and 5 of The Prelude, the paper concludes that 
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Wordsworth’s occasional use of these images in his work—what he might 
term objects removed from context in order to be classified, arranged, and 
positioned ‘In disconnection, dead and spiritless’—significantly bears on a 
central concern in his poetry: the relationship between history, nature, and 
the creative imagination.
